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We develop a model to understand the incidence of presidential and parliamentary institutions. Our
analysis is predicated on two ideas: first, that minorities are relatively powerful in a parliamentary
system compared to a presidential system, and second, that presidents have more power with respect
to their own coalition than prime ministers do. These assumptions imply that while presidentialism
has separation of powers, it does not necessarily have more checks and balances than parliamentarism.
We show that presidentialism implies greater rent extraction and lower provision of public goods than
parliamentarism. Moreover, political leaders prefer presidentialism and they may be supported by
their own coalition if they fear losing agenda setting power to another group. We argue that the model
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Within studies of comparative political institutions, the form of the constitu-
tion and its consequences has attracted particular attention. This literature
has emphasized the importance of the dichotomy between parliamentary and
presidential constitutions. For example, Linz (1978) proposed that presiden-
tial democracies tended to be less stable and more prone to coups.1 Presi-
dential systems have also been argued to have consequences for many other
outcomes, such as the strength of parties (Linz, 1994), and ﬁscal policy out-
comes such as the level of taxes and the provision of public goods (Persson,
Roland and Tabellini, 2000).
The majority of the research, however, has focused on the consequences
of presidentialism, not its’ origins (see the essays in Lijphart, 1992b, Linz
and Valenzuela, 1994, or Haggard and McCubbins, 2001). For instance, the
large literature on presidentialism in Latin America pays hardly any attention
to the question of why Latin American polities are presidential, something
which might be thought quite puzzling given that the preponderance of this
literature concludes that presidentialism has perverse consequences.2 Main-
waring and Shugart (1997) and Cheibub (2007) both propose that one should
think of presidentialism as being endogenous to the circumstances of societies
though they do not really advance an explanation of why polities are presi-
dential. Persson and Tabellini (2003) also recognize that the cross-national
incidence of presidentialism is endogenous and propose a number of sources
of variation in presidentialism (whether or not a country was colonized by the
British, latitude and the fraction of the population which speaks a European
language as a mother tongue).
That there is a need for a more explicit theory of the origins of presi-
dentialism can be illustrated by examining the constitutional experience of
1His work has stimulated much other research, some like Stepan and Skatch (1994) and
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000), which supports his thesis, and other,
for instance by Horowitz (1990), Carey and Shugart (1992), and Mainwaring and Shugart
(1997), which contradicts it.
2Implicitly, scholars seem to believe that presidentialism has deep roots going back
to ideological choices made at the time of independence 200 years ago and an earlier
generation of social scientists, such as Lambert (1969), suggested that presidentialism was
more eﬀective in creating national identities or promoting development (see Mainwaring,
1990).
1Sub-Saharan African countries since independence. As Table 1 shows, at
the time of independence, parliamentary constitutions outnumbered presi-
dential constitutions 4 to 1 in Africa.3 Yet in country after country there
was a switch towards presidentialism. This happens both in Francophone
and Anglophone countries. Any relationship in cross-national data between
having been a British colony and parliamentarism turns out to be driven by
Caribbean islands. Even in the wave of democracy which has swept over
Africa since the 1990s, no country has yet made a transition from presiden-
tialism back to parliamentarism, even though the switch to presidentialism
is clearly associated with a transition to a less democratic style of politics
in Africa. Also worthy of note is that only three of the 21 countries which
started with parliamentary institutions have not changed them, and two of
these - Botswana and Mauritius - the only two countries which have been
economically successful in Sub-Saharan Africa since independence.
These remarkable facts have been little studied. In the 1960s presiden-
tialism seems to have been seen as a natural reﬂection of ‘big man’ African
political culture. De Luisgnan (1969, p. 79) argues “the concentration of
all government responsibility in the hands of one man was in the spirit of
African tribal tradition.” Others argued that presidentialism was a response
to problems of underdevelopment and lack of national identities and it has
“largely been in response to the ruling elite’s determination to utilize insti-
tutions as resources for coping which such problems as national integration
and economic development” (Rothchild and Curry, 1978, p. 87). More re-
cently scholars of African politics, such as Horowitz (1990) have engaged in
t h ed e b a t eo nt h e‘ p e r i l so fp r e s i d e n t i a l i s m ’b u th a v ea r g u e dt h a ti nA f r i c a
the ‘winner take all’ nature of parliamentary institutions creates instability
while presidentialism with its checks and balances is a better system in an
ethnically divided society. Indeed, Lewis (1965) argued that parliamentary
3Around the same time as African states wrote presidential constitutions, many also
introduced one party states. Presidentialism was introduced before the one party state in
Congo, Dahomey, Mauritania, the Central African Republic, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Senegal
and Togo, but in the Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad the one-party
state preceded the move to presidentialism. In Zambia both came together in 1973. In
this paper however we shall only analyze the motivates for moving towards presidentialism
and treat them as conceptually distinct from that of creating a de jure one-party state
(see Zolberg, 1966, and Collier, 1982, on the one-party systems).
2institutions in West Africa played a role in the creation of authoritarianism.
In this paper we develop a model to try to help us understand constitu-
tional variation between presidentialism and parliamentarism. We use it to
ask some basic questions about why some countries have presidential con-
stitutions while others do not. We particularly focus on how the model can
help us understand the attractions of presidentialism in Africa since inde-
pendence. We also investigate whether the model is consistent with claims
made in the comparative politics literature that presidential democracies are
less stable.
We consider a polity formed of two groups, one of which is in a major-
ity and which diﬀer in their preferences with respect to government policy,
speciﬁcally public goods provision. In each group there are three sorts of indi-
viduals, citizens, politicians and political leaders. In the model citizens elect
politicians to the legislature using a system of proportional representation.
The political system determines the allocation of a ﬁxed budget between the
provision of public goods and rents to politicians.
We contrast two types of political institutions. Under presidentialism,
there are two separate elections, one where the leaders of the two groups
vie for the presidency, and one for the legislature. Once elections have been
held, the president then proposes a policy vector of public goods and rents
for politicians to the legislature which is implemented if it is supported by
a majority. If the vector does not gain a majority of votes a status quo
policy is implemented. When the constitution is parliamentary there is only
one election which is for the legislature. After the election a legislator is
chosen at random to be an agenda setter to nominate a legislator to be prime
minister. The nominated prime minister proposes a government coalition. If
the coalition he proposes receives majority support then the prime minister
proposes a vector of public goods. If this proposal receives a majority then
another agenda setter is chosen at random from the government coalition
to determine a division of rents which is then voted on. If at any stage a
proposal either to form a government or for a speciﬁc proposal is defeated
then a status quo policy is implemented.
The structure of the model is designed to embody two key features which
we believe are realistic aspects of presidential and parliamentary constitu-
3tions. First, the minority party is more powerful in a parliamentary system
than in a presidential system. This is true in our model because the presi-
dency, and thus agenda setting power, will always be captured by the major-
ity, while with some positive probability the prime minister can be from the
minority group. We believe that Carlson (1999, p. 12) grasps a fundamental
truth when he argues that
“The threat of no-conﬁdence votes means that MPs possess
bargaining power and that those in the opposition can have hopes
that they may be in the government in the relatively near future.
In a presidential system ... an opposition legislator is generally
condemned to remain in the opposition for the (often lengthy)
duration of the president’s term(s) in oﬃce.”
Second, a president has more power than a prime minister relative to
members of his own coalition. Intuitively this is because once elected a
president cannot be removed short of impeachment, while a prime minister
must always maintain the support of his or her colleagues. If Mrs Thatcher
had been president of Britain, she could not have been removed from the oﬃce
of prime minister by the Conservative Party as she was in November 1990
and Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh (2004, p. 567) report that in OECD
countries 163 out of 291 prime ministers left oﬃce without elections between
1946 and 1995. In the model, this feature is captured by the assumption that
a president has agenda setter power with respect to the entire policy vector,
whereas a prime minister only controls part of the vector.
A ni m p o r t a n tc o n s e q u e n c eo ft h e s ea s s u m p t i o n si st h a tp o l i t i c i a n si ng e n -
eral and particularly political leaders, capture more rents and provide fewer
public goods under a presidential system compared to a parliamentary one.
This is because when prime ministers are not the residual claimants on rents
they allocate more of the government budget to public goods. Another conse-
quence is that while political leaders prefer to be presidents rather than prime
ministers, conditional on being in the winning coalition, other politicians pre-
fer to be members of parliament rather than members of the legislature of a
presidential system.
Bringing these ideas and ﬁndings together we can understand the politics
of institutional choice. Political leaders prefer to be presidents. The insti-
4tutional preferences of other politicians are more complex. Conditional on
being in the winning coalition, those in the majority group prefer a parlia-
mentary constitution because it increases their power relative to their leader.
However, the drawback of such a constitution is that it also empowers the mi-
nority relative to a presidential system. In particular with some probability
the majority can lose agenda setting power. Therefore, politicians from the
majority group can be induced to support presidentialism if the probability
that they will lose power is suﬃciently large and if losing power is suﬃciently
bad. We show that losing power will be worse, and presidentialism more at-
tractive, when the preferences of the two groups with respect to public goods
are more polarized, when ideological diﬀerences are more extreme, and when
the society is poor in the sense that the government budget is low.
The comparative statics of the model may therefore help to explain why
African countries so quickly switched to presidential constitutions after in-
dependence and why Latin American politicians seem so content to remain
with presidentialism. As compared to countries in Western Europe or is-
lands in the Caribbean, which have sustained parliamentary constitutions,
the preferences of diﬀerent political salient groups in Africa, for instance,
are much more polarized. Political parties are often highly regional, for in-
stance in Sierra Leone the Sierra Leone People’s Party gets its’ support from
the South and East and the Mende ethnic group. Its’ main opponents, the
All People’s Congress Party, gets its support from the North and West and
the Temne ethnic group. This is a case where polarization is maximal (see
Cartwright, 1970, on the emergence of these patterns). A similar case is the
Sudan which has been ruled since independence by a small elite from the
North of the country (Seekers of Truth and Justice, 2000, Johnson, 2003,
Cobham, 2005) who share few common interests with those in Darfur of the
south of the country. This pattern is very common in Africa. It is this which
raises the stakes from agenda setting and makes the majority prefer to have
a president to make sure that they cannot lose agenda setting power to the
minority. African countries are also much poorer than others which have
sustained parliamentary regimes.
Our model also supports the claims of Linz about presidentialism. A
natural way to think about the stability of democracy is to ask whether those
5who lose out under democracy would be better oﬀ trying to overthrow the
system (Przeworski, 1991, Chacon, Robinson and Torvik, 2006). Whether or
not this is so depends on the relative payoﬀs. In our model the minority does
better with a parliamentary constitution and therefore has less incentive to
overthrow democracy. This follows because even ex post, if the majority hold
power, public good provision is greater with a parliamentary system and this
is better for the minority than the presidential system with lower public good
provision and greater rent extraction.
Our modelling approach builds on the seminal work of Persson, Roland
and Tabellini (1997, 2000), whose formulation was heavily inspired by presi-
dentialism in the United States. Nevertheless, the way presidentialism works
in Africa or Latin America, is diﬀerent in a number of ways. For one thing,
presidents have far more formal powers. For instance in Argentina, Chile
and Taiwan, only the president can introduce a budget and congress cannot
increase expenditures (Haggard and Shugart, 2001, p. 79) and it is quite
general for presidents to have the agenda setting powers with respect to bud-
gets (Carey and Shugart, 1992, Table 8.2, p. 155). In Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia and Russia presidents can decree new legislation without getting
any authority from the legislature (see Carey, Neto and Shugart, 1997, for a
comprehensive discussion of the powers of Latin American presidents).
In Africa the situation is even more extreme with scholars referring to
the “imperial presidency” (Carlson, 1999, p. 39, Nwabueze, 1975). Indeed,
scholars who have examined the transitions to presidentialism have seen it in
terms of a strengthening of the powers of the executive and reducing checks
and balances. For instance, Widner’s (1992) analysis of the 10th Amendment
to the Kenyan constitution in 1968 which established a presidential system is
that the amendment “eliminated Kenyatta’s dependence on a parliamentary
majority” (p. 67) and this served to “insulate the presidency from the bat-
tles within KANU [the Kenyan African National Union - Kenyatta’s party]
and to hamper eﬀorts to challenge the allocation of resources favored by the
Kenyatta government” (p. 68). Similarly, in Zimbabwe Laakso (1999, p. 134)
argues that after the change to a presidential constitution “the executive pres-
idency was a threat to the independence of the judiciary. Even Parliament,
instead of reﬂecting the supremacy of the people, had become accountable
6to the president.” Returning to Table 1, it is quite clear that the desire of
Joseph Mobutu to make himself president in 1967, rather than remain prime
minister of Zaire, represented a reduction in checks and balances. The same
can be said for Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe in 1987, Siaka Stevens in Sierra
Leone in 1978, Hastings Banda in Malawi in 1966, or Kwame Nkrumah in
Ghana in 1960.4
In our model, though there is separation of powers under a presidential
constitution in the sense that the president and legislature are separately
elected, this does not lead to the type of checks and balances that Pers-
son, Roland and Tabellini emphasize because we assume that the president
proposes the entire policy vector. The main conceptual diﬀerence, however,
is that our focus is on presidential systems where presidents have far more
powers than in the United States. As such our paper should been seen as a
complement rather than a substitute for the approach of Persson, Roland and
Tabellini. Unlike their paper we also explicitly model the choice over institu-
tions and have a separate election for the president. Furthermore, politicians
care about public goods and ideological matters and not just rents, and voters
are forward looking rather than retrospective.
We also extensively use insights from the models of parliamentary insti-
tutions by Huber (1996), Baron (1998) and Diermeier and Feddersen (1998).
Our model of how a parliament works is very similar to the models of these
papers, choosing the same status quo policy, though we also allow for the
provision of public goods and endogenous elections, as in Austen-Smith and
Banks (1988).
The paper is also related to a number of other lines of work. There are
a few more works on the origins of presidentialism, particularly in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union as scholars have tried to understand
why, for example, Hungary, Czechoslovakia or the Baltic states chose parlia-
mentary constitutions while other republics of the former Soviet Union and
Russia chose presidential institutions. Easter (1997) argued that this vari-
ation stemmed from how powerful communist era elites were. When they
were powerful they were able to impose presidentialism to best further their
4It is telling that most presidents face term limits while to our knowledge there is no
instance of a term limit on a prime minister. This is because prime ministers are naturally
checked by the nature of their interactions with their coalition and the legislature.
7interests. By contrast (p. 189)
“parliamentarism was preferred in cases in which old regime
elites had been dispersed ... Particular institutional features of
parliamentarism - no conﬁdence votes and legislative control of
the executive - guarded against any one party or group making a
proprietary claim on the state’s power resources.”
Lijphart (1992a) similarly argued that presidentialism arose in Poland
and not Hungary and Czechoslovakia because in the former the Communist
elites were much stronger and viewed this as the best way to perpetuate their
power. Frye (1997) examined the varying strength of presidential powers
and argued that stronger presidencies emerged when political elites were
powerful during constitutional negotiations and there was little uncertainly
about future election outcomes - hence they chose presidentialism to lock
in their power. Though all of this work is informal, motivated by diﬀerent
cases and methodologically distinct from ours, it does share with our analysis
the spirit that what favors presidentialism is a strong elite wishing to isolate
itself from the controls of a legislature. Most closely related is the thesis of
Carlson (1999) who studied the same facts as we do in Africa. He argued
that the appeal of presidentialism was that in highly fragmented legislatures
with weak party systems a president insured policy stability which risk averse
legislators desired.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we set out our model of pres-
identialism, discuss the timing of events, and our assumptions. In Section
3w ed e ﬁne the equilibrium of the model. We study two diﬀerent versions
of voting. We allow citizens to vote sincerely in the sense that citizens vote
for the group of politicians that have preferences most closely aligned with
themselves. We also allow citizens to vote strategically. In our model sincere
and strategic voting may coincide, but need not do so. We then in Section
4.1 investigate policy under presidentialism, and in Section 4.2 under parlia-
mentarism, before we compare the two and discuss why some of our results
diﬀer from those previous in the literature. Section 4.3 then derives the equi-
librium under the two diﬀerent assumptions regarding voting, and discuss
why diﬀerent equilibrium constitutions may emerge. In Section 5 we discuss
8the extension of the model to consider the implications of the diﬀerent con-
stitutional arrangements for the stability of democracy. Section 6 discusses
some alternative assumptions and mechanisms, before Section 7 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Citizens
We consider an inﬁnite horizon society with a set of citizens denoted by K.
The set of citizens are divided into two groups. One of the groups, which
constitutes a fraction λ of the population and which we term group L,i si n
majority and thus λ ≥ 1
2. The set of citizens in group L is denoted KL ⊂ K.
The other group is termed group S. The preferences of a voter k ∈ Kj in


















at time t,w h e r eβ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, Z
k,j
t+h is the instantaneous
utility at time t + h, G
j
t+h denotes the time t + h provision of the type of
public goods a member of group j prefers the most, G
−j
t+h denotes the time
t + h provision of the type of public goods the group other than j prefer
the most, and we assume that F(0) = 0, FG > 0, FGG < 0.I n ( 1 ) t h e
parameter γ ∈ [0,1] measures the similarity in preferences for public goods
for voters in the two groups. There is a conﬂict of interest between the two
groups regarding which public goods should be provided, and this conﬂict
of interest is stronger the smaller is γ. For simplicity we assume that only
one type of public goods can be provided in a given period. Finally, the
parameter δ
j ≥ 0 is the ideological utility which accrues to individual k of
group j if their group is in power. There may therefore be a conﬂict about
ideology which we assume is symmetric, i.e. δ
L = δ
S = δ. The higher is δ,
the stronger is ideological polarization.
2.2 Politicians
A subset of citizens from each group of voters decide exogenously to run for
oﬃce. Among politicians from each group of voters an individual is initially
9picked at random to be the group leader, denoted pj, j ∈ {L,S}.I n a
presidential regime this person runs for president, while in a parliamentary
regime this person runs for the post of prime minister. Politicians are elected
from the citizens and thus they have preferences for public goods and ideology
that are aligned with those of a citizen in the group from which they originate.
In addition, however, politicians value personal rents. Denote the set of
elected politicians by Pt+h, and the set of politicians elected from group
j ∈ {L,S} by P
j

























t+h is the instantaneous utility at time t +h and Ri
t+h denotes rents
to politician i at time t + h.T h u s t h e o n l y d i ﬀerence between politicians
and non-politicians from a particular group is that politicians also value the
r e n t sw h i c hc a nb ee x t r a c t e df r o mo ﬃce holding.
We assume that politicians can not commit to policy.5 Thus when in oﬃce











t+h = B, (3)
where B denotes per period public income which we treat as exogenous.
2.3 Constitution and timing of events
At the start of a period elections are held according to an existing political
constitution denoted ξt.W e c o n s i d e r t w o d i ﬀerent such political constitu-
tions - presidentialism, indexed by pr, and parliamentarism, indexed by pa.
Thus ξt ∈ {pa,pr}. Under presidentialism the president and the legislature
are both elected directly by citizens. Under parliamentarism the legislature is
elected directly by the citizens. The post election government formation and
policy process also diﬀers under the two constitutions. Under presidentialism
the president proposes policy, which is implemented if a majority of politi-
cians agree. If not we assume that some status quo policy is implemented.
5As in the citizen candidate model of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and
Coate (1997).
10Under parliamentarism the creation of the ruling coalition is determined by
bargaining between politicians in the legislature. The creation of the ruling
coalition is then subject to a vote in the legislature. If a ruling coalition is
formed, then for each separate policy proposal the ruling coalition needs the
support of a majority in the legislature. If the ruling coalition fails to receive
a majority in its establishment or on a policy proposal, then the government
is brought down and the status quo policy is implemented.
Finally, at the end of the period the prime minister or the president de-
cides whether or not to propose a change in the constitution. If no change is
proposed then the constitution is unchanged, while if a change in the consti-
tution is proposed, and approved by a majority of politicians, the change is
implemented and the next period starts with a new constitution.
More speciﬁcally, the sequence of events at each date t is as follows.
1. Elections take place according to the rules in the existing constitution
ξt ∈ {pa,pr}.
2. Government formation, legislative bargaining and policy is determined
according to the rules in the existing constitution ξt ∈ {pa,pr}.
3. Agents receive their payoﬀs.
4. The constitution ξt is either unchanged (ξt+1 = ξt)o rc h a n g e d( ξt+1 6=
ξt) according to the rules in the existing constitution ξt ∈ {pa,pr}.
5. A new period starts.
Before we proceed with the analysis we need to explain the constitutional
rules in steps 1, 2 and 4. Although we borrow heavily from existing liter-
ature in the modelling of elections and legislative bargaining it is useful to
discuss in detail some of the eﬀects of our assumptions and their motiva-
tion. Thus, introducing a bit more formalism that will be useful later on, the
constitutional details in steps 1, 2 and 4 are as follows:
Step 1 (Elections): In the legislative election each voter k ∈ K votes
for a politician of type j ∈ {L,S},a n dl e tv
k,j
t =1indicate that voter k votes
for a politician of group j and v
k,j
t =0otherwise. In a presidential election
similarly let v
k,pj
t =1if citizen k ∈ K votes for candidate pj, j ∈ {L,S},
11and v
k,pj
t =0otherwise. If the constitution is presidential, voters elect one
president and a legislature of politicians of mass M>2.6 The president
elected is the one with the most votes, and the seat share in the legislature
for each group j ∈ {L,S} is proportional to the vote share.
If the constitution is parliamentary, voters elect a legislature of politicians
of mass M +1, with a seat share in the legislature for each group j ∈ {L,S}
proportional to the vote share.
Step 2 (Legislative bargaining and policy): If the constitution is
presidential, ξt = pr, the president proposes a policy vector of public goods





t(pr)}i∈Pt}. Each politician i ∈
Pt decides to support the proposal (si
t(pr)=1 ) of the president or not to
support the proposal (si
t(pr)=0 ). If at least M
2 politicians in the legislature
vote in favor of the proposal the policy is implemented, and we term the set
of politicians who supported the president his coalition; Ct(pr). Otherwise a




If the constitution is parliamentary, ξt = pa, a politician i = nm ∈ Pt is
drawn at random from the legislature to decide which of the politicians pj,
j ∈ {L,S}, running for the prime minister post shall try to establish a ruling
coalition. We denote this nomination decision n
nm,pj
t =1if nm nominates
pj,a n dn
nm,pj
t =0otherwise. The nominated prime minister then proposes
ac o a l i t i o nCt(pa) ⊆ Pt to form the government. Let s
i,Ct(pa)
t (pa)=1if
politician i ∈ Pt votes in favor of a coalition Ct(pa),a n dl e ts
i,Ct(pa)
t (pa)=0
otherwise. If less than M
2 +1of the politicians i ∈ Pt vote in favor of
the coalition, the government is not formed and the same status quo policy
as under presidentialism Ri
t = B
M+1 is implemented. If at least M
2 +1of the
politicians vote in favor of the coalition Ct(pa) the government is formed, and





t (pa)}.L e ts
i,Gt(pa)
t (pa)=1if politician i ∈ Pt votes in favor of
the policy vector Gt(pa),a n dl e ts
i,Gt(pa)
t (pa)=0otherwise. If less than M
2 +1
of the politicians vote in favor of the policy the government is brought down
and the status quo policy Ri
t = B
M+1 is implemented. If a majority supports
6Below we shall also simplify by letting a share of the votes for politicians from one
group map into the same share of legislators from that group. Thus we assume that M is
suﬃciently large that such an approximation is valid despite M being discrete.
12the proposal the government survives and a new rent agenda setter termed
i = ra ∈ Ct(pa)−pj is drawn at random to propose a vector of rents. (Note
that the rent agenda setter ra is drawn from within the ruling coalition).
Let this proposed rent division be denoted ρ
ra,Ct(pa)
t .L e t s
i,ra
t (pa)=1if
politician i ∈ Pt votes in favor of the division of rents proposed by ra,a n d
let s
i,ra
t (pa)=0otherwise. The proposal is implemented if it gets a majority
among politicians i ∈ Pt. Otherwise the government is brought down and









Step 4 (Constitutional changes): Under a presidential regime the
president decides whether or not to propose a switch to a parliamentary
regime, i.e. ξt+1 = pa. Under a parliamentary regime the prime minister
decides whether or not to propose a switch to a presidential regime, namely
ξt+1 = pr.L e t D(ξt)=1denote a proposal to switch the constitution
given the existing constitution ξt ∈ {pa,pr},a n dl e tD(ξt)=0denote the
case without a proposal to change the existing constitution. Each politician
i ∈ Pt decides to support an eventual proposal (sci(ξt)=1 ) of changing the
constitution, or not to support such a proposal (sci(ξt)=0 ). If a change
in the constitution in proposed it is implemented if at least M
2 +1of the
politicians i ∈ Pt approve. Otherwise the constitution is unchanged ξt+1 = ξt.
2.4 Discussion of assumptions
A number of important assumptions in this election and government for-
mation game should be noted. First, when a proposal does not achieve a
majority the status quo policy implemented in both regimes is to share all
remaining public funds between all elected politicians. Although alternative
status quo policies could have been modelled, the crucial feature we want to
ensure with this simple formulation is that the status quo ‘rule’ is the same
in both regimes. We do not want some exogenously imposed diﬀerences in
status quo policy between the regimes to deﬁne their characteristics. Thus
we have settled for a very simple status quo policy, which is the same as in
Baron (1998) and Diermeier and Feddersen (1998), and which is the same in
both sorts of constitutions.
Second, as government formation is determined by post election bargain-
13ing in a parliamentary regime, while a president himself decides on his gov-
ernment, we assume that the political minority has more power in the former
than in the latter regime. We have settled for the simplest possible version
of such an assumption, where in a presidential regime the president himself
proposes the ruling coalition while in a parliamentary regime a politician is
drawn at random from the legislature to decide who shall try to form a ruling
coalition. In this way the political agenda setting power of the minority is
less than that of the majority, but it is not zero.7 The speciﬁcf o r mo fs u c h
an assumption is not crucial - however the content of the assumption is. If
the minority has no political power in a parliamentary regime, then as will
be easily understood from the analysis below, a switch to presidentialism is
never possible in our model.
Third, with a parliamentary constitution the prime minister also has less
political power within the ruling coalition than a president has. This is cap-
tured in our model by the assumption that the prime minister does not have
agenda setting power in all policy dimensions, rather he has initial agenda
setting power in the formation of the ruling coalition and in the ﬁrst round
of policy proposals. Thus, when forming a ruling coalition and making pol-
icy proposals he must take into account how his policy aﬀects later policy
proposals from members within his coalition.
Fourth, while there is no vote of conﬁdence in the legislature under a
president elected directly by the citizens, under a parliamentary regime the
ruling coalition is dependent on the continuous support in the legislature.
In our model this is captured by the assumption that at each government
formation or policy stage, the ruling coalition is brought down if it does not
receive a majority. As a consequence, a vote on an issue is not only a vote
on that issue viewed in isolation, but also a vote on the survival of the ruling
coalition. Thus in a parliamentary regime with a vote of conﬁdence, as is
well known from the work of Huber (1996), Baron (1998) and Diermeier and
7This asssumption is consistent with the literature which assumes that the probability
that a party leader will be recognized to form a coalition depends on the party’s vote share
(for relevant empirical evidence see Diermeier and Merlo, 2004 ). One diﬀerence here is
that we have only two parties, while the literature focuses on government formation where
no single party has an absolute majority. Nevertheless, in African or Latin American
countries where parties are highly fragmented and party switching common after elections,
the possibility of an opposition having a chance to take agenda setter power is real.
14Feddersen (1998), politicians in the ruling coalition get higher utility than
they would otherwise do.
Fifth, note that the agenda setting power over constitutional changes can
alternatively be interpreted as veto power: seen in this light our assumptions
imply that under presidentialism the president has veto power over changes
to the constitution, while under parliamentarism the prime minister has such
veto power.
3D e ﬁnition of equilibrium
We focus below on pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE), in which
strategies depend only on the payoﬀ-relevant state of the world and not on
the entire history of play (other than the eﬀect of this history on the current
state). The payoﬀ-relevant state here only includes ξ ∈ {pa,pr}, and since
we formulate the model recursively we drop time subscripts for the remainder
of the paper.
3.1 Strategies







where I(ξ) is an indicator function such that I(ξ)=1if ξ = pr and I(ξ)=0
otherwise. If the leader is not in power his set of strategies is the same as that
of other politicians. Denote also by ψ
−j the strategies of all other players
(citizens and other politicians) than the leader pj.
Denote the strategy of a politician i elected for the legislature (other than













where the additional indicator functions are such that In(i)=1if i = nm,
In(i)=0otherwise, and Iρ(i)=1if i = ra,a n dIρ(i)=0otherwise.
Similarly denote the strategies of all other players by φ
−i.
Finally, denote the strategy of a citizen k by χk = {vk,j(ξ),vk,pj(pr)},a n d
let χ−k be the strategies of all other citizens and politicians.
153.2 Equilibrium concepts
Since we model expected discounted utility the one stage deviation principle
can be used even if we have an inﬁnite horizon game.8 Thus let V pj(ξ|ψ
−j)
denote the expected utility of group leader pj, j ∈ {L,S}, of starting out with
a constitution ξ ∈ {pa,pr} given the strategies of all other players ψ
−j.A l s o
let Πj(ξ,ψ
j|ψ
−j) denote the probability that the group leader from group j
becomes the national leader under constitution ξ,w h e nh i ss t r a t e g yi sψ
j,
and given the strategies of all other players ψ
−j. Let similarly Ω(ξ,ψ
j|ψ
−j)
be the probability the constitution will not be changed at the end of the
period under initial constitution ξ ∈ {pa,pr}, when his strategy is ψ
j,a n d
given the strategies of all other players ψ
−j.
We can now write payoﬀs recursively, and we begin with those of a polit-




































The two ﬁrst lines in (4) consist of his current period expected utility. To
clarify the intuition we explain the equation in some detail: with probability
Πj(ξ,ψ
j|ψ
−j) the political leader becomes the national leader (president or
prime minister), in which case his instantaneous utility is Upj(ξ,ψ
j|ψ
−j,p j),
i.e. the utility for group leader pj when the constitution is ξ,h i ss t r a t e g y
is ψ
j, the strategies of the other players are given by ψ
−j,a n di ti sg i v e n
that pj becomes the national leader. With the corresponding probability he
does not become national leader, in which case his instantaneous utility is
Upj(ξ,ψ
j|ψ
−j,p −j). The last two lines in (4) state his discounted expected
continuation value, where with the probability Ω(ξ,ψ
j|ψ
−j) the constitution
is unchanged when it starts out as ξ, his strategy is ψ
j, and the strategies of
the others are given by ψ
−j. The corresponding probability the constitution
is changed is given by 1−Ω(ξ,ψ
j|ψ
−j), in which case his continuation utility
is V pj(−ξ|ψ
−j) (i.e. the payoﬀ if the constitution is changed).
8See e.g. Theorem 4.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), which applies here as in our
game the overall payoﬀs are a discounted sum of per period payoﬀs that are bounded.
16Next we ﬁnd the value functions for politicians in the legislature. Let
Wi,j(ξ|φ
−i) denote the expected utility of a politician i from group j in the
legislature starting out with a constitution ξ ∈ {pa,pr} given the strategies
of all other players φ
−i. Furthermore let the probability that politician i
from group j is included in the coalition when his own group leader wins
power be Φi,j(ξ,φ
i|φ
−i,p j), while the probability he is included in the coali-






























































With a probability Πj(ξ,φ
i|φ
−i) the group j leader becomes the national
leader. In that case there is a probability Φi,j(ξ,φ
i|φ
−i,p j) politician i is
included in the coalition, in which case he gets the instantaneous utility
Ui,j(ξ,φ
i|φ
−i,p j,i ∈ C), while under the corresponding probability his in-
stantaneous utility is Ui,j(ξ,φ
i|φ
−i,p j,i / ∈ C). With probability 1−Πj(ξ,φ
i|φ
−i)
his group leader does not win power, in which case he gets the expected cur-
rent payoﬀ under a national leader from the other group, which is a symmetric
expression to what he gets under a national leader from own group. Finally,
the last two lines in (5) shows the discounted expected continuation value.9
Finally let Xk,j(ξ|χ−k) denote the expected utility of a voter k from group
9Strictly speaking we have made a shortcut here, as these payoﬀs also depend on the
probability the politician that is elected in the present period is not elected in the future.
However, this probability will turn out to be zero, and we simplify the expressions at this
stage by incorporating that.































where the interpretation follows immediately from those we gave for the two
previous Bellman equations.
We study the pure strategy MPE of this model under two alternative as-
sumptions about the voting strategies of citizens. We term these two diﬀerent
cases sincere voting and strategic voting. We deﬁne them as follows:
Deﬁnition 1: A sincere pure strategy MPE consists of voting decisions
vk,j(ξ)=vk,pj(pr)=1 ,∀k ∈ Kj,j∈ {L,S},ξ∈ (pa,pr} by the citizens, and
a vector of strategies {{ψ
j}j∈{L,S},{φ
i}i∈P} for group leaders and politicians
that that simultaneously solve (4) and (5).
Deﬁnition 2: A strategic pure strategy MPE consists of a vector of
strategies {{ψ
j}j∈{L,S},{φ
i}i∈P,{χk}k∈K} that simultaneously solve (4), (5),
and (6).
Thus under sincere voting citizens vote for politicians that have pref-
erences most closely aligned with themselves, while all group leaders and
politicians play best response to the strategies of all other players for all
states. Under strategic voting all strategies by all players are best responses
to the other strategies for all states. (Obviously sincere voting and strategic
voting may produce the same equilibria, but as we will see they need not do
so).
Another way to think about the diﬀerence between these two types of
equilibria is that the sincere voting case can be seen as an equilibrium where
voters are ‘passive’ and the real policy choices are made in the legislature
with little voter control. Thus this case most closely resembles the cases of
Baron (1998) and Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) where voting by citizens
is not incorporated. In the strategic voting case, by contrast, voters can
have more power over policy decisions in the legislature because in their
strategies they incorporate the full set of strategies by all the other players,
with the possibility that they can elect representatives that have preferences
18less aligned with themselves if this produces a higher expected discounted
payoﬀ. Thus this case most closely resembles the case of Austen-Smith and
Banks (1988).
4A n a l y s i s
To ﬁnd the MPE we ﬁrst ﬁnd the current period equilibrium for a given
constitution and composition of the legislature. We then ﬁnd the MPE under
the two alternative voting assumptions from the Bellman equations (4), (5),
and (6).
4.1 Presidentialism
Consider a president elected from group j ∈ {L,S}. The president must ﬁnd
the policy vector {Gj(pr),G −j(pr),{Ri(pr)}i∈P} that maximizes (2) subject
to (3) and the presidential constitutional rules.
I nt h ec a s ew h e r eg r o u pj has half or more of the politicians in the legisla-
ture, the president has suﬃcient support in the legislature to form a winning
coalition of politicians from own group should he wish to do so. The analysis
in this case can be simpliﬁed by observing (i) that the utility of the presi-
dent is higher when he forms a coalition only with members of his own group
rather than forming a coalition which includes politicians from the legislative
minority, (ii) only public goods of the type Gj and not G−j will be oﬀered,
(iii) the president picks a minimum winning coalition and thus the mass
of politicians he includes in addition to himself is M
2 , and (iv) that he will
never oﬀer more rents to politicians that is necessary to induce them to vote
in favor of his policy proposal, which (v) implies that all politicians in the
minimum winning coalition other than the president receive the same rent.
Recall that the personal rents to the president is denoted by Rpj(pr).W i t h























where (8) is the budget constraint and (9) the participation constraint for
politicians in the coalition. Ri is the rent to each politician in the coalition
(other than the president). For simplicity we have skipped the reference to
the constitution ξ = pr on the variables. Inserting from (9) for Ri in (8),























The expression for rents to the politicians in the coalition other than the
president then follows from (9), and in turn the rents for the president is
residually determined in (8).
In the case where group j has less than half of the politicians in the
legislature, the president cannot form a minimum winning coalition consisting
of politicians from his own group only. Thus he must decide whether to form
a minimum winning coalition that includes all politicians i ∈ Pj and some
politicians i ∈ P−j, or to form a minimum winning coalition that in addition
to himself includes only politicians i ∈ P−j. It can easily be veriﬁed that
forming a coalition including only part of the politicians from his own group
is always inferior to including them all. Thus these are the only two options
we need to consider. However, as these cases are easily analyzed in a similar
manner to the case where the president and the majority of the legislature
originate from the same group (and since both of these additional cases will
be oﬀ the equilibrium path) we delegate these cases to the Appendix.
We may summarize the political equilibrium under presidentialism as:
Proposition 1 With a presidential constitution the president forms a min-
imum winning coalition of mass M
2 . Those outside the minimum winning
coalition receive zero personal rents.
When the majority of the legislature and the president are from the same






















Consider a prime minister from group j ∈ {L,S}. Under parliamentarism
the prime minister knows that if the coalition survives, the best response for
t h ea g e n d as e t t e rw h op r o p o s e st h ed i v i s i o no ft h er e n t si st op r o p o s er e n t s
to the members of the ruling coalition so that their participation constraints
are fulﬁlled with equality. Thus, conditional on survival of the coalition, we
have the rents to those in the coalition who are not agenda setters for rents
given by
B−Gj(pa)−G−j(pa)
1+M , while the rents of the agenda setter is then given
by M+2
2(M+1)(B − Gj(pa) − G−j(pa)).
Consider ﬁrst the case where group j has a legislative majority. Then the
prime minister will form a coalition C(pa) with politicians i ∈ Pj only, and he
will oﬀer public goods of type Gj. In addition to himself the prime minister
picks a minimum winning coalition and thus the number of politicians he
includes in addition to himself is M
2 . Recalling that the personal rents of the
prime minister is denoted Rpj(pa), and denoting the rents of the rents agenda
setter Rra(pa), then conditional on survival of the coalition the maximization


























where Ri is the rent to each politician in the coalition, and the prime minister
realizes he will receive the same rents as the other members of his coalition
in the last round (except the rent agenda setter). Again for simplicity we
have not indexed the variables by the constitution ξ = pa.T h es o l u t i o nf o r






21and Ri and Rra = M+2
2(M+1)(B − Gj) follow from (11) and (12).
The prime minister must now decide if he prefers this solution to propos-
ing something that will lead the status quo policy to be implemented, as well
as investigate if his coalition partners will accept the proposal. The proposal











































is the probability of becoming the rent agenda setter.
It is easily veriﬁed that if the coalition solution is preferable for the prime
minister it will also be so for his coalition members (as they have a possibility
of becoming rent agenda setter while the prime minister has not). Thus if
the prime minister’s utility of the coalition solution is higher than the status
quo alternative, he will propose the coalition solution and the members of the
coalition will vote in favor of that. The condition for the coalition solution










j) ≥ 0, (18)
w h i c hi sa l w a y sf u l ﬁlled as FGG(Gj) < 0.
Thus if a prime minister from group j is asked to form a coalition, and
if group j has a legislative majority, those asked to join the coalition will be
happy to do so, and a coalition will always form.
Next we turn to the case where group −j has a majority in the legislature.
In the same way as for a president from the legislative minority, a prime
minister from the legislative minority must decide if he should include the
politicians from his own group j in the coalition, or if he should only include
politicians from the other group −j.
22Consider ﬁrst the case where he decides to include politicians from his
o w ng r o u p .T h e nt h et y p eo fp u b l i cg o o do ﬀered is Gj, and the maximization
problem of the prime minister is exactly the same as in the case where he
has a legislative majority. Thus the solution for public goods and rents are
the same and the participation constraints for the prime minister and for the
politicians from his own group are fulﬁlled. The participation constraint for






































j) ≥ 0. (20)
In the continuation we assume that this condition is fulﬁlled, in which case
the prime minister is able to form a coalition with politicians from his own
group included. We delegate the case where (20) is not fulﬁlled, so that the
prime minister will not be able to form a coalition including politicians from
his own group, to the Appendix. All our qualitative results to follow are
valid also in this case.
Finally, note that for the politician drawn at random from the legislature
to decide which of the politicians running for the prime minister post shall try
to establish a ruling coalition it will always be a best response to nominate
a prime minister from his own group.
We may summarize the political equilibrium under a parliamentary regime
with the following proposition.
Proposition 2 With a parliamentary constitution a minimum winning coali-
tion C(pa) containing the prime minister and in addition a mass M
2 of politi-
cians will always form, and the coalition will have the continuous support of
the legislature. Those outside the minimum winning coalition receive zero
personal rents.
I ft h em a j o r i t yo ft h el e g i s l a t u r ea n dt h ep r i m em i n i s t e ri sf r o mt h es a m e

















If the minority of the legislature and the prime minister is from the same

















Under parliamentarism politicians from both groups provide more public
goods than under presidentialism. The reason for this is that parliamentarism
involves sharing of agenda setting power within the ruling coalition. As a
result the prime minister is not the residual claimant on rents. The sharing
of agenda setting power within the ruling coalition implies that compared to
presidentialism, politicians oﬀer more in directions where their preferences
are (more or less) aligned such as for public goods, and less in directions
where there is a direct conﬂict in preferences - such as for the distribution of
rents.
For the same reason total personal rents to politicians in the coalition is
higher under presidentialism than under parliamentarism. This is the op-
posite result from Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000), which predict that
rents are the highest under parliamentarism. The diﬀerence from the Person,
Roland and Tabellini (2000) result is due to their association of presidential-
ism with checks and balances, while under parliamentarism in their model
there are no such checks and balances. Then under parliamentarism the
politicians can appropriate all public resources for personal rent, which in
their model is the only thing politicians care about. To prevent this voters
implement a strategy of providing politicians suﬃciently more rents today
that they prefer not to steal the whole public sector budget, but instead
be reelected so that they can get a new round of rents tomorrow. In this
way a parliamentary constitution generates more rents to politicians than a
presidential one.
The comparison of our results to those of Diermeier and Feddersen (1998)
may seem more interesting, since we have modelled the same eﬀects which
lead to high rents to coalition members in their case - but still get the opposite
24result. The reason is that although we have basically used their framework,
we have extended the dimensions of policy. In their setting a given amount
of rents is divided between politicians, and the parliamentary regime allows
politicians within the coalition to capture a higher fraction of these rents
than otherwise. In our setting we include public goods and an endogenous
amount of total rents. Then, as in their model, the utility of politicians
within the coalition is higher with parliamentarism - although this involves
lower not higher rents. When preferences are (more or less) aligned along one
dimension, then under parliamentarism politicians choose to capture higher
utility in that direction and scale down the components of utility where
they have a direct conﬂict. Thus since we have extended the Diermeier and
Feddersen logic to include public goods and an endogenous amount of total
rents, we get that a parliamentary regime with a vote of conﬁdence procedure
produces a lower amount of total rents.
In our model a politician has a higher utility of being a president than be-
ing a prime minister. For all the other politicians, however, as we explained
above, it is more favorable to be in the winning coalition under a parliamen-
tary than under a presidential constitution. Under a parliamentary consti-
tution coalition members have more power than under a presidential regime.
Policy is to a larger degree decided by all the coalition members under par-
liamentarism. A vote for the public goods proposal under parliamentarism
is not just a vote for that proposal - but also a vote for the survival of the
coalition. Conditional on the survival of the coalition, not only the prime
minister has agenda setting power. In turn, this makes the prime minister
weaker, but the other members of the coalition stronger. By voting in favor
of the proposal of the prime minister politicians ensure that (i) they continue
to be members of the ruling coalition and (ii) in addition have a chance of
gaining future agenda setting power. By voting together the coalition en-
sures that they get the future coalition beneﬁt sa tt h es a m et i m ea se n s u r i n g
that the agenda setting power of a prime minister is weaker than that of a
president.
This raises the question why members of a parliamentary coalition would
vote for presidentialism? Such a regime involves lower utility of being a part
of the coalition than under parliamentarism. The point, however, is that
25although this intuition is correct it is not the complete intuition. The reason
is that the probability of being included in future coalitions may depend on
if there is a presidential or parliamentary regime.
4.3 Voting and equilibrium
We now investigate the equilibrium in the case of sincere voting among cit-
izens and in the case where citizens vote strategically, starting out with the
former. In line with our motivation we assume throughout that the initial
constitution is parliamentary.
4.3.1 Sincere voting
Under sincere voting all voters vote for politicians from their own group, thus
vk,j(ξ)=vk,pj(pr)=1 ,∀k ∈ Kj,j ∈ {L,S},ξ ∈ {pa,pr}. I nt h i sc a s et h e
share of group L politicians in the legislature will equal the share of group
L in the population λ, and the share of group S politicians in the legislature
will equal 1−λ. Under presidentialism the president elected will be the leader
of group L. From this an obvious but important result follows.
Proposition 3 Under sincere voting presidentialism is an absorbing state,
i.e. Ω(pr)=1 .
Proof. Under presidentialism the elected president will be the group L
leader, thus ΠL(pr)=1 . Politicians from group L will form a majority in
the legislature, and thus the president suggests a minimum winning coalition
C(pr) ⊆ PL,G L(pr)=F
−1
G ( 2
2+M), GS(pr)=0 , Ri(pr)= B
M+1 − F(GL(pr)),
∀i ∈ C(pr), RpL(pr)= M+2
2(M+1)B + M
2 F(GL(pr)) − GL(pr).T h i s p r o p o s a l
receives a majority and is implemented. The president must then decide if
he shall propose a change in the constitution. If the constitution becomes
parliamentary then ΠL(pa)=λ<ΠL(pr)=1 . Furthermore independently
of if he wins power or not under parliamentarism, the one period payoﬀ
is lower than under presidentialism. Thus since presidentialism involves a
higher probability of winning a bigger payoﬀ compared to parliamentarism,
he does not propose a change in the constitution, and Ω(pr)=1 .
The intuition for this result is immediate. Under presidentialism, by not
changing the constitution the presidential candidate from the biggest group
26will be able to lock out the presidential candidate from the minority with
probability one. In addition it is better to be a president than a prime
minister, and thus the constitution will be stable given that it becomes pres-
idential.
The remaining question, then, is what happens when the constitution
starts out as parliamentary.
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(1 − λ)(2λ − 1)
λ
¶
+( λ +( 1− λ)γ)F(G
L(pa))
parliamentarism is an absorbing state , i.e. Ω(pa)=1 .
(ii) When (21) does not hold then parliamentarism is not a stable consti-
tution. The probability the constitution is switched to a presidential one in a
given period is λ>1
2. (From then on, presidentialism is the absorbing state).
Proof. We start out with a parliamentary constitution. From Proposi-
tions 1, 2 and 3 it follows that if there is a prime minister from the majority,
then he will propose a change in the constitution if he can mobilize suﬃcient
s u p p o r tf o rs u c har e g i m ec h a n g e .F r o mt h es a m ea r g u m e n ti tf o l l o w st h a ta
prime minister from the minority will never propose a shift away from par-
liamentarism. This will just give him a zero probability of winning power
a n dp e r s o n a lr e n t s ,a n dm a yd i s t o r tt h et y p eo fp u b l i cg o o d sh ep r e f e r sa s
well as their quantity.
The remaining question is now if a majority of the politicians in the
legislature will support a proposal from the majority prime minister to change
the constitution into a presidential one.
It is immediately clear that the minority politicians in the legislature
will never support such a proposal. A switch to presidentialism leaves them
with a zero probability of becoming part of future ruling coalitions, always
having public goods of the type they do n o tp r e f e r ,a n di na d d i t i o nh a v i n g
less public goods than under a parliamentary constitution. Thus a shift to
27presidentialism can only be undertaken if it gets the support of politicians
from the majority group.
To investigate this we ﬁrst ﬁnd the payoﬀ of politicians if the constitution
becomes presidential. Then we already know that Ω(pr)=1and ΠL(pr)=1 .




2λ a politician i ∈ PL is included
in the minimum winning coalition. Inserting this and presidential policy














If the majority politicians in the legislature does not support a shift to
presidentialism, then there is a probability ΠL(pa)=λ the majority politi-
cian is elected prime minister, in which case there is a probability Φi,L(pa)=
1
2λ a politician from the majority group is included in the minimum winning
coalition. With probability 1−λ the group S leader becomes prime minister,




2λ am a j o r i t y
politician becomes part of the winning coalition. Also, if a shift to presiden-
tialism is not preferred today neither will it be tomorrow, thus Ω(pa)=1 .


















Wi,L(pa) ≥ Wi,L(pr) implies inequality (21) which gives Part (i) of the propo-
sition since then politicians from the majority will not support a change in
the constitution, and therefore the majority prime minister see no reason to
propose such a shift. Part (ii) of the proposition follows since when (21) does
not hold Wi,L(pr) >W i,L(pa), then majority politicians support a shift in
the constitution, and such a shift will be proposed by a prime minister from
the majority group (but not from the minority group). The probability there
is a prime minister from the majority group is λ>1
2.







presidentialism is more likely to be installed the lower is γ, that is the stronger
is the conﬂict over which public goods should be provided. When this conﬂict
28is strong, the future utility of being included in minority coalitions under par-
liamentarism is low, making this regime relatively less attractive compared
to presidentialism. Therefore, presidentialism, by ensuring that a politician








1−β, implying that presidentialism is
more likely to be installed the higher is ideological polarization δ.W i t h a
strong ideological conﬂict it becomes attractive for majority politicians to
install presidentialism, because compared to a parliamentary constitution
this increases the future probability that someone of their ideological type
will be the agenda setter. Furthermore, for a suﬃciently high δ it can easily
















dB thus reduces to 1
2 <λ+(1−λ)(2λ−1),
w h i c hi sa l w a y sf u l ﬁlled. Therefore presidentialism is more likely to be in-
stalled the lower is the public budget B. The intuition for this is that politi-
cians (other than group leader) have more political power with a parliamen-
tary constitution. The marginal eﬀect of an increase in the budget on per-
sonal rents is therefore higher under parliamentarism, and thus the utility of
parliamentarism increases relatively faster with the budget than the utility of
presidentialism, explaining why a high public budget makes parliamentarism
more likely and a low public budget makes presidentialism more likely. Thus
if budgets are smaller in poor than in rich countries, presidentialism is a ‘poor
man’s disease’.
4.3.2 Strategic voting
We have seen that when politicians originating from the majority group of
citizens also constitute a majority in the legislature, these politicians may
switch the constitution from being parliamentary to being presidential. Such
a switch implies less provision of public goods and more rents to politicians.
For the citizens of the majority group this naturally raises the question if
sincere voting in the elections for the legislature constitutes best response;.if
citizens from the majority group instead vote for politicians from the minority
29group they ensure that the constitution remains parliamentary. Thus the
interesting case we need to consider is the case where a legislative majority
of group L politicians would support a group L prime minister in switching
the constitution from being parliamentary to presidential. If this is not the
case, then sincere voting is best response for citizens in the majority group.
Note also that sincere voting is always best response for the minority group
citizens.
The majority group citizens have to trade oﬀ voting sincerely and (sooner
or later) get a presidential constitution, with voting strategically for minority
group politicians so as to avoid a presidential constitution but (now and then)
get a type of public goods and an ideology they do not prefer. This trade-oﬀ
is captured in the following:
Proposition 5 For majority group citizens sincere voting in the election for
the legislature is best response when
(M + γ(M +2 ) )F(GL(pa))
(2M +2 )
<
(λ +( 1− λ)γ)(1 − β)F(GL(pa)) + λβF(GL(pr))











Proof. Consider ﬁrst the case where citizens from the majority group
decide to vote for politicians from the minority group so as to prevent politi-
cians from switching the constitution. The best response given that they
want to achieve this is to elect suﬃciently many representatives from the
minority that a switch to presidential i s mi sb l o c k e d ,a tt h es a m et i m ea s
they maximize the probability that a politician from their own group be-
comes prime minister. Thus the best response given that they will prevent a
switch to presidentialism is to vote in such a way that the legislature consists
of M
2 +1politicians from the minority group S and M
2 politicians from the
majority group L.T h e nΩ(pa)=1and ΠL(pa)= M
2M+2. Inserting in (6) we




(M + γ(M +2 ) )F(GL(pa)) + Mδ
(1 − β)(2M +2 )
. (23)
30The alternative is to vote sincerely for politicians from own group, im-
plying that at the ﬁrst instance a politician from own group is elected prime
minister, then the constitution switches to a presidential one (and stays so).
Thus in this case Ω(pa)=1− λ and ΠL(pa)=λ. Inserting in (6) the ex-















Inserting (25) in (24) and solving we get
X
k,L(pa|sn)=
(λ +( 1− λ)γ)










(1 − β)(1 − (1 − λ)β)
.
The proposition then follows by inserting from (26) and (23) in Xk,L(pa|sn) >
Xk,L(pa|pv).
















(1−(1−λ)β),e q u i v a l e n tt oM>2M(1 − λ)(1 − β) − 2λ,w h i c hi s
always fulﬁlled when λ>1
2. Thus sincere voting is more likely to be best
response with a strong conﬂict over the type of public goods. The intuition is
that in such a case it is costly for majority group citizens to vote for minority
group politicians, since the utility loss in those cases a minority politician












dγ reduces to M
2M+2 <
λ
(1−(1−λ)β),w h i c hi sa l w a y sf u l ﬁlled when λ>1
2. When ideological polariza-
tion is high voters are more likely to vote sincerely, as in such a case being
31able to switch to presidentialism, locking in own ideology (at some point in
the future), is relatively valuable.
Thus sincere voting is more likely to be best response when there is a
strong conﬂict over the type of public goods and strong ideological polariza-
tion. For γ suﬃciently close to zero and δ suﬃciently high sincere voting will
always be best response. Exactly the circumstances that make politicians
want to introduce presidentialism give rise to a situation where it is not opti-
m a lf o rc i t i z e n st ov o t ep r e v e n t i v et os t o pi t .T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h i si st h a ta s
long as politicians are elected from the citizens, their preferences are aligned
with citizens when it comes to ideology and provision of public goods. Then
exactly when it is attractive for politicians to switch to presidentialism so as
to lock in ideology and public goods provision in their preferred direction, it
is also unattractive for citizens from the majority group to vote preventive.
When politicians and citizens of the majority group have exactly the same
preferences for public goods and ideology, then how could best response by
majority citizens be to prevent majority politicians from getting a majority in
the legislature - wouldn’t sincere voting always be best response? The answer
to this is no, and the reason is that the majority politicians may want a switch
to presidentialism when the majority voters do not because presidentialism
may imply higher personal rents. In particular presidentialism is relatively
more attractive to politicians when budgets are small, while for voters the
size of the budget is irrelevant in the trade-oﬀ between voting strategically
or sincerely. For completeness we include a proof that sincere voting is not
always best response in the Appendix.
5 Presidentialism and Democratic Consolida-
tion
What does the model imply about the argument associated with Linz (1978)
that presidential regimes are less able to consolidate democracy? Though
Linz and other authors that have debated these ideas have many diﬀerent
mechanisms in mind which are beyond the scope of the model that we have
developed, the model does generate an answer to this question. We here
simply present an intuitive discussion without introducing a full model to
32incorporate democratic consolidation.
The model we have developed so far generates payoﬀst od i ﬀerent agents
in democracy which depend on the nature of the constitution. Now extend
the game so that in any period either group of agents could pay some cost and
attempt to overthrow the regime. If they do so, imagine they can create a
dictatorship of the group and allocate the government budget from then on to
maximize the utility of the group. Assume that decisions to mount a coup are
taken on the basis of whether or not it maximizes the sum of utilities of agents
in the group (so we abstract from any issues of collective action or collective
choice). If the cost of overthrowing democracy and the ability to do so is the
same for both groups, it will tend to be the minority group which has the
greater incentive to overthrow democracy. This is for the simple reason that
under democracy it does not get the public good it prefers and its politicians
gets zero rents. Note however, that under presidentialism the supply of public
goods is even lower and hence the utility of the minority group is lower under
a presidential constitution. This is true even if the minority are not in the
government. Since under a parliamentary constitution the minority has some
probability of forming the government it is true, as we have already shown,
that the minority are better oﬀ under parliamentarism. Thus for a given
cost of undertaking a coup, the incentive to do so is clearly higher for the
minority under presidentialism. Hence there exists a part of the parameter
space where the minority will not mount a coup when the constitution is
parliamentary and will do so when it is presidential.
If one introduces uncertainly and a stochastic opportunity to mount a
coup along the lines of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), the model can easily
be extended to show that even though switching to presidentialism can un-
consolidate democracy in the sense that it can induce the threat of a coup
where none previously existed, nevertheless is can still be optimal to in-
troduce presidentialism if, for example, preferences for the public good are
suﬃciently polarized or the budget suﬃciently low. Thus the model provides
one clear mechanism which supports Linz’s ideas.
336 Discussion of alternative assumptions and
additional mechanisms
Here we discuss our assumptions, as well as some additional mechanisms al-
ternative assumptions may give rise to. First, consider our assumption that
the minority has more political power under parliamentarism than under
presidentialism. It should be apparent by now that as long as this is the
case, irrespective of how this eﬀect is modelled, the trade-oﬀ we have iden-
tiﬁed for majority group politicians and majority group citizens is present.
However it is also interesting to consider a case without this assumption.
If the minority has no power under parliamentarism in the sense that their
probability of being agenda setter is zero, then the majority will never sup-
port presidentialism which consequently can not be installed, as our trade-oﬀ
is not present.
Second, consider the case where a politician can promise which of the
politicians in his group should be part of future coalitions when he forms
one. Such an alternative assumption does not rule out a switch to presiden-
tialism since in this case the probability of being part of future presidential
coalitions increases from 1
2λ to 1 for the included politicians from the majority
group, while the probability for majority politicians of being part of future
p a r l i a m e n t a r yc o a l i t i o n si sa l w a y sl e s st h a no n e( s i n c ei ti sn o tc r e d i b l ef o r
the minority group leader to promise that he will form a coalition without
politicians from his own group).
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we developed a positive model of the choice of constitutions.
Our approach was based on two principles which we consider capture key
diﬀerences between presidential and parliamentary institutions. First, that
minority groups in a legislature are more powerful in a parliamentary system,
and second, that a president is more powerful with respect to his own coalition
than a prime minister is. We showed that these assumptions imply that
presidential systems lead to greater extraction of rents by politicians and
lower provision of public goods. Moreover, while political leaders always
wish to be presidents, members of their coalition do not necessarily favor
34this since they have greater power vis a vis a prime minister. However,
parliamentarians may allow a prime minister to become a president if they
fear losing agenda setting power to another group.
We showed that such a constitutional change is more likely to happen
when the conﬂict over public goods is high, when ideological polarization is
strong, and when public budgets are small. We argued that our conceptu-
alization of the forces lying behind these two regimes seems to capture well
the costs and beneﬁts that politicians face in situations where presidents are
relatively powerful, as they are in Africa and Latin America. Our model
complements and extends existing work by Persson, Roland and Tabellini
(2000) who focused on situations with less presidential dominance, such as
in the United States.
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399A p p e n d i x
( A 1 )T h ec a s ew h e r et h ep r e s i d e n ta n dt h em a j o r i t yi nt h el e g i s l a -
ture originate from diﬀerent groups
As mentioned in the text there are two cases we need to consider Consider
ﬁrst the case where the president decides to include the politicians from his
o w ng r o u pi nt h ec o a l i t i o n . T h i sc a no n l yb et h ec a s ew h e nh ed e c i d e st o
oﬀer public goods of type Gj, since otherwise politicians from the legislative
m a j o r i t yg r o u pw i l lb ec h e a p e rt ob u y . T h u sh eo ﬀers all politicians from
his own group the same rents B
M+1 − F(Gj), while he has to oﬀer higher
rents, B
M+1 − γF(Gj), to the members of the minimum winning coalition
from outside his own group. Denote the share of politicians in the legislature
from group −j by μ. The remaining maximization problem for the president






















(1 − μ)M +1+( μ − 1
2)γM
.
The expression for rents to the politicians inside the minimum winning coali-
tion then follows from their participation constraints being fulﬁlled with
equality, and in turn rents for the president follows from the budget con-
straint.
Alternatively the president may choose to include only politicians i ∈ P−j.
This can only be so if he decides to provide public goods of type G−j.A f t e r
inserting from the participation constraints and budget constraint in a similar























Again the rents to the politicians follows from their participation constraints,
and the rents for the president from the budget constraint.
40The president must now choose between these two alternatives to ensure
that he picks the one which gives him the highest utility. Observe that the
utility in the case where in addition to himself he only include politicians
i ∈ P−j is independent of μ, while the utility in the case where he includes
the politicians i ∈ Pj is decreasing in μ. Observe further that with μ suﬃ-
ciently close to 1 his utility is always highest when he forms a coalition with
politicians i ∈ P−j only, while with μ>1
2 suﬃciently close to 1
2 his utility is
always highest when he also includes politicians i ∈ Pj. It follows that there
exists an unique μ = μ∗ ∈ [1
2,1] where μ∗ is implicitly deﬁned by the μ that
satisﬁes
µ














where if μ ≤ μ∗ the president forms a minimum winning coalition including
the politicians from his own group, while if μ>μ ∗ he forms a minimum
winning coalition with politicians from the legislative majority group only.
Thus, to summarize: if the minority of the legislature and the president
are from the same group j ∈ {L,S}, then:























































41(A2) The case where coalition formation does not include politi-
cians from the prime minister’s own group
Here we ﬁr s ti n v e s t i g a t et h ec a s ew h e r e( 2 0 )i sn o tf u l ﬁlled, so that under
parliamentarism a prime minister from the minority group does not want to
form a coalition including politicians from his own group. Thus consider now
the case where he decides to include politicians from the majority group −j
only. Then the type of public good oﬀered is G−j, and the maximization








































w h i c hi sa l w a y sf u l ﬁlled. The utility of the politicians from the major-
ity is higher than that of the minority prime minister, hence their partic-
ipation constraints will always be fulﬁlled (as their utility of status quo
is the same as for the prime minister). Thus to summarize this case: if
FG(Gj(pa))






M+1 , ∀i ∈ C(pa) 6= ra,
Rra(pa)= M+2
2(M+1)(B − G−j(pa)).
In this case, therefore, politicians from the majority get their preferred
public good even when the prime minister is from the minority group. How-
ever, they get less public goods than a prime minister from their own group
42would deliver, and therefore also in this case the utility of the majority politi-
cians and citizens is higher under a prime minister of their own group rather
than a prime minister from the minority group. For this reason, the tradeoﬀs
we investigate in Section 3.3 of the paper are still present, and the qualitative
conclusions we reach in this case where (20) is not fulﬁl l e da r et h es a m ea s
the ones in the case we study in the main text where (20) is fulﬁlled.
(A3) Proof that sincere voting is not always best response
Next we include a proof that sincere voting is not always a best response
for the voters in the model. To show this it is suﬃcient to show that there
exists at least one constellation of parameters where preventive voting gives
voters a higher expected utility than sincere voting. Thus assume that γ =1 ,
that β → 1,a n dt h a tB = GL(pa) so that we are conﬁdent that the public
b u d g e ti ss u ﬃciently high that we have an interior solution for public goods,
and that condition (20) is fulﬁlled. Then from (21) we know that majority













Assume that this condition holds and that politicians of group L switch the
constitution if they form a majority in the legislature. We now show that
given this there exists an equilibrium where voters strictly prefer to vote
preventive, which then contradicts a claim that sincere voting is always best



























2 suﬃciently low and δ suﬃciently large this condition always holds,
and thus preventive voting is best response. It then only remains to check
if this is consistent with an internal solution to the model, that is that (i)
public goods provision under presidentialism is positive and that (ii) rents
43to politicians under presidentialism are positive. From (27) we ﬁnd that




2λ(1−λ)(M+1).T h u sw en e e dt os h o wt h a t( 2 8 )c a na l s ob ef u l ﬁlled
when δ is not allowed to be greater than this upper boundary. Inserting this






































L(pa) < 0, (29)
















which can be reformulated to







2 is not too large this condition is fulﬁlled, and thus there exists a
preventive voting equilibrium with an interior solution for public goods. Fur-
thermore, in this equilibrium rents to politicians are positive which can be








2λ(1−λ)(M+1). Thus as there exists an equilibrium where preven-
tive voting is best response, sincere voting is not always best response in the














































































































South Africa 1910 Parliamentary
Sierra Leone 1961 Parliamentary
1964 Parliamentary
Tanzania 1964 Parliamentary
Zimbabwe 1980 Parliamentary
Zaire 1960 Parliamentary
Zambia